When we try to make a difficult decision, it usually seems like we have genuine options open to us. After we make our decision, it seems like we could have decided differently. However, when we think about the world more generally, it seems things happen because of previous factors. We tend to think there has to be an explanation for every event, and perhaps this applies even to our decisions. The threat to free will comes from the idea that our actions happen of necessity; that is, they are inevitable. These considerations are at the heart of the problem of free will and determinism.
The problem of free will and determinism is one of the great philosophical problems. It has its roots in the earliest texts, yet the problem continues to inspire debate. As far as we know, every culture in every age has regarded people as making free choices and being responsible for their actions. Like most great philosophical problems, the problem of free will and determinism is connected with a number of other fundamental questions. The issue over determinism is a basic question about the nature of the universe. If we have free will, then this tells us something important about the world—that at least part of the world isn’t determined. The problem of free will also is tied up with how we think of ourselves. We feel proud of our accomplishments and guilty for our misdeeds. The problem of free will also connects in obvious ways with deep ethical issues: If we don’t have free will, then it seems like we can’t be morally responsible for our actions.
There are three primary components to the problem of free will, all of which will be covered in the course. The first component is a descriptive project, which attempts to answer the questions: What is free will? What would we have to be like in order to have free will? Similarly, we must ask: What is moral responsibility? What is required for us to be morally responsible? The idea is if we want to know whether we have free will, we had best begin by understanding what free will is supposed to be in the first place! One prominent view is that the notion of free will is directly at odds with the claim that everything is determined. However, as we will see, some philosophers maintain that free will is not at odds with determinism.
After reviewing the most important proposals concerning what is required for free will and responsibility, we will explore the second component of the problem, the substantive questions. Here the two questions are: Do we have free will? Are we morally responsible? Since many philosophers claim that free will is inconsistent with determinism, a pressing question is whether determinism is true. If free will is inconsistent with determinism and determinism is true, then the answer to the substantive question is that we do not, in fact, have free will. Obviously, this is a question that depends largely on what science uncovers about the world, and so we will spend several lectures considering the contributions of contemporary science to whether we have free will.
The third component of the free will problem is the prescriptive project of determining what we should do in response to what we discover about free will. If we don’t have free will, how should this affect our relations with each other? How should it affect our broader moral and legal practices? The final part of the course explores these issues from a variety of perspectives.
The issue of free will is historically ancient and spans different traditions. As a result, the course will chart the early history of the problem of free will. We will also consider how problems connected to free will arise in a variety of religious traditions, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Within philosophy, a wide range of views will be represented on the fundamental questions about what free will is and whether we have it. A full appreciation of the free will problem demands sensitivity to the sciences as well, especially physics, neuroscience, and psychology. The course will review the most important work that bears on free will from each of these areas. Since an important part of the free will problem concerns ethical consequences, the course will introduce basic ethical frameworks, and consider the relation between our emotional lives and the assumption of free will. Finally, the course will consider pressing questions of public policy and free will, including the justification of punishment and the reach of excuses in legal responsibility.
These are very old questions, and while we will see how philosophers and scientists have advanced the debate, the problems are deep. The course will not offer a definitive answer to the problems of free will. Rather, the aim is to communicate the nature
and breadth of the issues, as well as the most significant attempts to address the problems. The course provides necessary information for making an informed decision about the problems of free will. But on these issues, there is no expert with an easy answer. We all have to decide for ourselves.